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BOARD DIVERSITY: MORE THAN A 
GENDER ISSUE? 
MICHAEL ADAMS∗ 
There has been extensive research conducted on the importance of corporate 
governance around the world. The research seems to demonstrate that, 
regardless of whether corporations are based in common law or civil code 
systems, their longevity and sustainability arise from good corporate 
governance. However, the evidence does not clearly demonstrate a 
correlation between a particular organisation’s governance structure and 
practices and its share price. Around the world the question of board 
diversity is gaining in importance. The beginning of the debate in the 1960s 
centred on gender. While it is essential to conduct a debate on gender 
diversity, other aspects of diversity should also be considered. Race, culture 
and even age may have a direct impact on the performance of a board. 
Australian companies, particularly those listed on the ASX, have a poor 
record of instituting any type of diversity. The USA and European Union have 
a much wider range of policies to promote diversity on corporate boards. The 
key question is how best to regulate to promote diversity across gender, race, 
culture and age. The historical approach of regulating diversity by setting 
targets and requiring disclosure does not seem to have delivered substantial 
change. Is it the right time to impose mandatory requirements, or are there 
other alternative strategies? Without doubt change is required, but there will 
be opposition. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The last two decades have seen major debates on corporate governance, based 
on a variety of different paradigms, mostly linked to legal frameworks, finance, 
accounting and economics. Board structure and composition have been 
particularly debated and are key measurable aspects of corporate governance 
practices, with correlations to financial returns, sustainability (the longevity of 
the corporation) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Critical distinctions 
can be drawn between Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed companies, 
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public companies, private companies, not-for-profit associations and 
government-controlled entities. Corporate governance issues, including those 
arising from the structure and composition of the governing body, affect all 
these organisations. To mandate a particular board composition by imposing a 
quota of specific types of board members would be controversial in Australia. 
Nevertheless, pressure from a variety of stakeholders, investors, government, 
stock exchanges and human rights advocates, may increase the urgency of 
changes to board composition; progress may need to be faster than the glacial 
progress currently being made.  
The international research on board composition in general has centred on the 
gender debate. However, the diversity of board membership goes far beyond 
the issue of gender. This article will assess the need to increase diversity — for 
the primary purpose of improving performance and corporate social 
responsibility — on all boards and in particular ASX listed company boards. 
Obviously, gender diversity is a key type of diversity, but it is also important to 
consider the importance of other aspects of diversity, such as diversity based 
on race and cultural heritage (expressed as ‘ethnicity’), education, professional 
background and age, as critical factors in a board’s composition. Limited 
empirical research has been conducted on these other aspects of diversity in 
corporate governance. Further research should therefore be a high priority to 
stimulate and inform the debate over targets and/or quotas for board 
membership. This article examines the role of diversity and its benefits in 
corporate governance, international experiences with board diversity and the 
impact or effectiveness of targets and quotas imposed by governments to 
achieve greater diversity. 
II THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS 
DEFINITIONAL HISTORY 
A large amount of academic literature has been dedicated to the formal 
definition of corporate governance. One of the issues has been whether to 
accept that different disciplines have different definitions of corporate 
governance, so that the agreed concepts in the legal field can be distinguished 
from those applying in the fields of economics, finance, accounting, and 
management theory. Even the history of corporate governance is disputed. 
Early references to the 13th century Swiss Cantons1 use the term expressly, as 
does the more contemporary Sir Adrian Cadbury in the landmark Cadbury 
1 Michael Adams, ‘The Convergence of International Corporate Governance Systems — Where 
is Australia Heading?’(2002) 54(1) Keeping Good Companies 14, 15.  
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Report (1992).2 The Cadbury Report’s frequently cited definition simply states 
that corporate governance is ‘the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled’. It is worth considering that when Sir Adrian was delivering his 
committee’s landmark review on corporate governance, following the UK 
pension/superannuation scandal involving Robert Maxwell, ‘very few people 
had actually heard of either email or the internet’.3 Cheffins asserts that  
‘Corporate Governance’ first came into vogue in the 1970s in the United 
States. Within 25 years corporate governance had become the subject of 
debate worldwide by academics, regulators, executives and investors… 
and that by ‘the end of the 1990s … “corporate governance” was well 
entrenched as academic and regulatory shorthand.’4 
Licht provides the following definition of corporate governance: 
Corporate governance can be described as the institutional framework that 
regulates the division and exercise of power in the corporation. ‘Power’ is the 
key concept in corporate governance. This definition implies that when 
individuals are left to their own devices, corporations must rely on an 
institutional framework in order to function properly, let alone efficiently.5  
One thing that is clear about the concept of corporate governance is that it has 
not been conclusively defined. Commentators often speak of corporate 
governance as an indefinable term, something akin to love, joy or even 
happiness, which we essentially know the nature of, but for which words do not 
provide an accurate picture. Nevertheless, in the Australian context, the 
Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council Principles 
(2014) attempt to define it,6 as did Justice Neville Owen, the Royal 
Commissioner in the HIH Insurance Ltd collapse investigation (set up to probe 
Australia’s largest corporate collapse). The term ‘corporate governance’ is 
2 Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of the Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report (1992) (‘Cadbury Report’). 
3 Michael Adams, ‘Global Trends in Corporate Governance’ (2012) 64(9) Keeping Good 
Companies 516, 517. 
4 Brian R Cheffins, ‘The History of Corporate Governance’ (Law Working Paper No 180/2012, 
European Corporate Governance Institute, January 2012) 1 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1975404>. 
5 Amir N Licht, ‘Corporate Governance’ (Entry for the Encyclopaedia of Financial Globalisation, 
European Corporate Governance Institute, November 2011) 1 <http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1786382>.  
6 Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council, ‘Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations 3rd edition’ (Report, ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
March 2014) 3. 
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described in the Final Report of the Royal Commission, as ‘the framework of 
rules, relationships, systems and processes within and by which authority is 
exercised and controlled in corporations.’7 
Harwell Wells, an American historian, states:  
The traditional view dates [the modern debates over corporate governance] 
to 1932 with the publication of Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner Means’s The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, a work that delineated the 
separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation and the 
problems that separation caused.8  
Wells further notes, in the words of Thompson and Thomas, that: ‘For most of 
the twentieth century, the dominant paradigm of agency in corporate 
governance within legal academia was that provided by Berle and Means in 
their classic 1932 book.’9  
Corporate governance took centre stage and became a global phenomenon 
during the 1990s in conjunction with several developments such as the 
implementation of market-building structural reforms in former soviet bloc 
countries, the Asian financial crisis in 1997, and the European Union’s 
continuing efforts toward capital market integration. 
During the 1990s the various corporate governance codes came into existence 
for major stock markets around the world. The first was contained in the 
abovementioned Cadbury Report in the UK (1992), produced by a committee, 
chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, on the financial aspects of corporate 
governance.10 Based on what was considered good practice, the Code called 
for: 
The wider use of independent non executive directors, with ‘independence’ 
defined as ‘independent of management and free from any business or other 
relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of independent 
judgment, apart from their fees and shareholding’;  
7 Commonwealth of Australia, The HIH Royal Commission, The Failure of HIH Insurance 
(2003) vol 1, xxxiii. 
8 Harwell Wells, ‘The Birth of Corporate Governance’ (2010) 33(4) Seattle University Law 
Review 1247, 1247 citing Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property (Harcourt, Brace & World, rev ed, 1968).  
9 Robert B Thompson and Randall S Thomas, ‘The Public and Private Faces of Derivative 
Lawsuits’ (2004) 57 Vanderbilt Law Review 1745, 1756 cited in Wells, ibid 1248. 
10 Cadbury Report, above n 2. 
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The introduction of an audit committee of the board with independent 
members; 
The division of responsibilities between the chairman of the board and the 
chief executive, or, if the roles were combined, strong independent 
directors.11  
The Cadbury review laid down the ‘principles based’ or ‘comply or explain’ 
approach of soft law, rather than the hard law or sledge hammer approach to 
regulation. It is worth noting that, according to Cheffins, the phrase ‘corporate 
governance’ was only ‘mentioned once in the Times newspaper up to 1985’ and 
that the Economist refrained ‘from using the phrase until 1990. The pattern 
began to change when the accountancy profession, the London Stock Exchange 
and the Financial Reporting Council, which regulates accounting standards in 
the U.K., established in 1991 the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance.’12  
Cheffins continued:  
The 1992 Cadbury Report also achieved notoriety internationally. The 
Cadbury Committee encapsulated its recommendations in a Code of Best 
Practice and arranged for enforcement by persuading the London Stock 
Exchange to add the Code as an appendix [to] the London Stock Exchange’s 
listing rules, with listed companies becoming obliged either to comply with 
the provisions of the Code or explain why they had failed to do so. The 
Cadbury Code would soon serve as a model for the development of corporate 
governance codes in various countries around the world.13  
The follow up UK report, known as the Hampel Report, stated that Cadbury 
had ‘struck a chord in many overseas countries; it has provided a yardstick 
against which standards of corporate governance in other markets are being 
measured’.14 
These observations establish links to the broad set of principles and framework 
established by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
11 Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies, and Practices (Oxford University 
Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 12.  
12 Cheffins, above n 4, 18. 
13 Ibid 19. 
14 Committee on Corporate Governance, ‘Final Report’ (Report, Committee on Corporate 
Governance, January 1998) 18 (‘Hampel Report’).  
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(OECD) and the applied approach of a standards form.15 The OECD’s 
definition of corporate governance states that: 
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined.16 
In Australia, the influence of the 1992 Cadbury Code and the OECD definitions 
inspired the ASX to establish the Corporate Governance Council with 21 
members. The first ASX Corporate Governance Principles were established in 
2003, with a new second edition in 2007, and a major amendment on diversity 
in 2010. A third edition appeared in 2014. The ASX states that corporate 
governance is  
the framework of rules, relationships, systems and processes within and by 
which authority is exercised and controlled in corporations. It encompasses 
the mechanisms by which companies, and those in control, are held to 
account. A good corporate governance code promotes investor confidence.17  
We may not agree with the precise construction of the corporate governance 
definition, but, just as with art, we all recognise it when we see it. A deeper 
question is: what are the benefits of good corporate governance practices? 
III BENEFITS OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Once there is a general agreement on what constitute corporate governance 
practices, the bigger challenge is to demonstrate that good corporate 
governance produces actual benefits.18 There is overwhelming corroborative 
15 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (2015) OECD <http://www.oecd.org/corporate/oecdprinciplesof 
corporategovernance.htm>.  
16 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (OECD Publications Service, 2004), 11. See also OECD, ibid, as the 
OECD is currently inviting public comment on the draft 2014 Review of the OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance. 
17 Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council, above n 6, 3.  
18 Michael Head, Scott Mann and Simon Kozlina, Transnational Governance: Emerging Models 
of Global Legal Regulation (Ashgate Publishing, 2012) and Anona Armstrong, ‘Corporate 
Governance Standards: Intangibles and Their Intangible Value’ (2004) 17(1) Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 97 cited in Adams, ‘Global Trends’, above n 3. 
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and empirical evidence of the impact of sustainability in governance.19 Adams, 
for example, has stated that:  
There are numerous studies as to the benefits of corporate governance for 
global entities, whether they be transnational corporations or the more 
traditional multinational companies. Around the globe, by far the majority of 
business entities are privately owned (and/or family businesses) with a small 
percentage being quoted on a local stock exchange, in a single legal 
jurisdiction.20 
Impressive data was produced by Claessens and Yurtoglu21 who examined the 
corporate governance literature from the fields of economics, finance, 
management and legal scholarship in many countries and jurisdictions over the 
last decade. The authors’ detailed survey of the literature provides evidence of 
the importance of corporate governance at a number of economic points. These 
extensive studies provide clear evidence of a link between economic 
development and corporate governance. The extensive cross-country research 
demonstrates that corporate governance is central to financial development. 
Weak corporate governance can be seen to prevail in financial markets that tend 
to function poorly by global standards. Poor governance increases market 
volatility and lack of transparency, creating unfair markets. Countries and 
companies that adopt best practices in corporate governance are not guaranteed 
success, but provide evidence that good corporate governance improves 
sustainability and lays the groundwork for long-term success.  
The awareness that individual directors and officers are subject to personal (as 
opposed to corporate) liability has increased the awareness of the need for good 
corporate governance systems. Personal liability is expressly required by ASX 
Principle 1 of its Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations.22 
Adams states that ‘all directors have major concerns with their personal 
liability’.23 Further, the regulators, ASIC and ASX, are clearly improving their 
enforcement of the corporations law as is evidenced by their improved success 
19 See, eg, Alice Klettner, Thomas Clarke and Michael Adams, ‘Corporate Governance Reform: 
An Empirical Study of the Changing Roles and Responsibilities of Australian Boards and 
Directors’ (2010) 24(2) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 148, a report on the 
implementation of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles between 2003 and 2007.  
20 Adams, ‘Global Trends’, above n 3, 518. 
21 Stijn Claessens and Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate Governance and Development – An Update 
(Global Corporate Governance Forum, 2012) <http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/corporate+governance/publications/focus_cas
e+studies/focus+10+corporate+governance+and+development+-+an+update>. 
22 Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council, above n 6. 
23 Adams, ‘Global Trends’, above n 3, 518. 
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rate in recent years. In 1995 only 12 officers from the 933 652 registered 
companies were gaoled. ASIC had an 81 per cent successful litigation rate in 
74 major cases and 7287 misconduct matters. By 2013, there were 2 012 241 
registered companies in Australia and only nine directors were gaoled, but there 
was a 90 per cent successful litigation rate in 144 major cases and 11 682 
misconduct matters.24 
Keay notes:  
It is trite to say that companies governed by Anglo-American corporate law 
are governed by both the general meeting of shareholders and the board of 
directors, but typically, today, either legislation or the company’s articles of 
association or by-laws will vest the board of directors with very broad general 
management powers, many of which are then delegated to company 
managers and officers. Of course, the constitution of the company will 
determine the breadth of the powers granted and this is likely to differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The general meeting is often granted reserve 
powers, but these are not frequently exercised.25  
Keay further observes that ‘“[a]ccountability for conduct is a pervasive feature 
of human association” and it operates expressly and implicitly in the field of 
corporate governance’.26 
IV DIVERSITY WITHIN BOARD STRUCTURES AND 
COMPOSITION 
Board structure (that is, three or more directors on the main board, plus board 
committees, such as audit, nominations, and risk committees) and board 
composition (that is, the skill and competency set expected of an effective 
board) are quite distinct concepts. Most Anglo-American based companies will 
have a unitary board — that is, a single board of directors which oversees the 
management of the company. Some European jurisdictions, such as Germany 
and France, have adopted a bilateral board structure, with distinct advisory and 
representative boards, with employees elected to specific roles.  
24 See Michael Adams, ‘Faulty Lines in Corporate Law: Issues for Insurance Policies’ (2014) 
66(8) Governance Directions 504, 505 Table 1. 
25 Andrew Keay, ‘Exploring the Rationale for Board Accountability in Corporate Governance’ 
(2014) 29 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 115, 118.  
26 Ibid 146 quoting A Allen, ‘2003 Daniel J Meador Lecture: Privacy Isn’t Everything: 
Accountability as a Personal and Social Good’ (2003) 54 Alabama Law Review 1375, 1377. 
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Unitary boards and their size (the average membership is 8.4 with the most 
common distribution being between 8 to 12 members)27 have been the subject 
of extensive commentary. The board’s composition, that is who makes up the 
actual board of directors, will vary depending upon a number of factors. 
Membership of a board will depend on a candidate showing a list of 
competencies, including strategic, accounting/finance, and legal expertise 
together with skills in managing risk and managing people, familiarity with 
financial markets, and industry knowledge.28 The personal qualities that a 
successful director should have include integrity, business acumen, curiosity, 
courage, interpersonal skills, genuine interest, and the quality of being an active 
contributor to board processes. Board effectiveness can be improved by a 
boardroom culture of mutual respect, honesty and openness that encourages 
constructive debate, and a diversity of experience, styles, ages, genders and 
cultural backgrounds.29 
The Australian Productivity Commission30 in its 2009 inquiry into executive 
remuneration in Australia found that a mix of skills, knowledge and experience 
on boards is necessary for independent, well-informed decision making which 
is in the best interest of the company and its shareholders. Diversity on boards 
can promote independence of views, and enrich debate and constructive 
analysis. Age-related data from ASIC shows that the average age of the 23 448 
directors of public companies (whether or not ASX-listed) was 53 years, with 
32 per cent over 60, and 27 per cent between 50–60 years old.31 For the larger 
ASX-listed companies the average age jumped to 59 years. (Similarly, the 
average age of directors on European listed companies was 58 years.) For top 
100 ASX companies the average age for females was 56 and for men 61 years. 
In respect of ethnic backgrounds the ASIC data shows that 67 per cent of 
directors were born in Australia, 10 per cent in the United Kingdom, three per 
cent in New Zealand, 2.8 per cent in the USA, and 2.2 per cent in South Africa. 
The remaining 15 per cent of the survey sample were from over 100 different 
countries. Although some studies have proposed a positive relationship 
between ethnic diversity on boards and performance,32 the Corporations and 
27 The Korn Ferry Institute, ‘The Diversity Scorecard 2013: Measuring Board Composition in 
Asia Pacific’ (Report, The Korn Ferry Institute, 2013) 12 <http://www.kornferry.com/ 
institute/721-the-diversity-scorecard-2013-measuring-board-composition-in-asia-pacific>.  
28 Anthea McIntyre, Tomorrow’s Boards (Australian Institute of Company Directors, 2011) 15. 
29 Ibid 17. 
30 Productivity Commission, ‘Executive Remuneration in Australia’, (Inquiry Report No 49, 
Productivity Commission, 2009) <http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/93590 
/executive-remuneration-report.pdf>. 
31 This data is also supported by the Korn Ferry Institute, above n 27, 18.   
32 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC), ‘Diversity on Boards of Directors’ 
(Report, CAMAC, March 2009) 25 <https://www.google.com.au/search?q=Corporations 
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Markets Advisory Committee report noted that such findings are not 
conclusive,33 as will be discussed below. 
None of the steps in Tricker’s 2010 report Twenty Practical Steps to Better 
Corporate Governance related to a need for board diversity.34 Tricker did 
observe that the on-going ‘rules versus principles dilemma’ reflected a move 
away from the differences between Anglo-American unitary boards, 
continental European two tier (supervisory and executive) boards, and Asian 
approaches such as Japanese keiretsu or Chinese family-orientated company 
boards.35 There is a schism between US corporate governance and the corporate 
governance of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, 
India, Singapore and Hong Kong. The former has been enforced by way of 
regulation and the use of the rule of law (such as the Sarbane-Oxley Act) since 
the collapse of Enron and WorldCom. By comparison corporations in the latter 
countries have been asked to comply with voluntary codes, and to explain if 
necessary why they have not complied. Good corporate governance is about the 
effectiveness of the governing body rather than merely the compliance code. 
Corporate governance needs to be distinguished from management, which runs 
the enterprise. Unlike management, the governing body ensures that the 
company is well run and is heading in the right direction: that is to say, that 
there is a balance between corporate strategy and ensuring that it translates into 
policies and plans for management to action (the performance role). The role 
of the governing body is to oversee management and accountability (the 
conformance role).36 
The ASX’s eight central principles of Corporate Governance are intended to 
clarify the frequently debated role of the board, in the same way that Justice 
Owen did in the HIH Royal Commission Final Report. It is fair to say that there 
have been a range of different interpretations of what boards are required to do. 
The corporate law reform think-tank, the Corporations and Markets Advisory 
Committee (CAMAC) (unfortunately abolished in 2014 as a government 
austerity measure), in its 2009 report on diversity on boards of directors, 
expressly stated: ‘The role of the board of directors is to direct a company on 
+and+Markets+Advisory+Committee+(CAMAC),+%E2%80%98Diversity+on+Boards+of+
Directors,+(Report,+CAMAC,+March+2009&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&gws_rd=cr& 
ei=NgGvVYi9LYLYmgXm5YGgBg>. 
33 Ibid 51. 
34 R I Tricker, ‘Twenty Practical Steps to Better Corporate Governance’ (Corporate Secretaries 
International Association, March 2010) Corporate Secretaries International Association, 
March, 2010.  
35 Ibid 3. 
36 Ibid 8. 
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behalf of the shareholders.’37 This statement represents a shareholder-centric 
view of what corporate governance is. The traditional formulation is that the 
role of the board is to direct the company on behalf of the shareholders, setting 
the strategic direction and aims of the company, providing resources for their 
implementation, and directing or overseeing the management of the company’s 
business, and compliance with its obligations. The 2009 report never uses the 
term ‘monitoring’, in fact. The closest it gets to the concept of monitoring is the 
expression ‘overseeing’.38 
V MAKE-UP OF A BOARD OF DIRECTORS — QUESTIONS 
OF DIVERSITY 
The heart of the question is: who sits on the board of directors and what is the 
actual composition of the board of directors? The make-up of the board is 
absolutely critical to the success of the company. There are a variety of 
definitions of what is meant by diversity of board membership. Diversity, both 
in its gender-specific and broader meaning, impacts board composition.  
The relationship between good governance and board diversity has been the 
subject of international research. A study by Mahadeo, Soobaroyen and 
Hanuman,39 on the emerging economy of Mauritius, found very positive links 
between the key elements of board diversity (or heterogeneity) amongst listed 
companies operating in an emerging economy (Mauritius), and the extent to 
which these influence financial performance. With respect to age it was found 
that ‘[t]he inherent nature of company management and career progression does 
play a significant role in having a board which mainly consists of mature, 
experienced and by default older directors’.40 Mahadeo, Soobaroyen and 
Hanuman observe that:  
Whilst an age-diverse board may enable some division of labour and 
encourage board development and learning, it relies on the assumption that 
directors will play their selected roles and does not address the likely short-
term issues of communication and trust arising from generational gaps. On 
the other hand, a homogeneous board is likely to avoid these latter issues but 
37 CAMAC, above n 32, 11.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Jyoti Mahadeo, Teerooven Soobaroyen and Vanisha Hanuman, ‘Board Composition and 
Financial Performance: Uncovering the Effects of Diversity in an Emerging Economy’ (2012) 
Journal of Business Ethics 375.  
40 Helen Kang, Mandy Cheng and Sidney J Gray, ‘Corporate Governance and Board 
Composition: Diversity and Independence of Australian Boards’ (2007) 15(2) Corporate 
Governance 194, 197 cited by Mahadeo, Soobaroyen and Hanuman, ibid 377.  
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composition may encourage complacency, cronyism, lack of interest in new 
ideas/strategies and decisions based on compromises.41  
Interestingly, Mahadeo, Soobaroyen and Hanuman note that companies were 
more reluctant to share age related information than other information. Only 26 
companies made that data available to the authors.42 
The commentary on Recommendation 1.5 of the ASX Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations states that,  
while the focus of this Recommendation is on gender diversity, diversity has 
a much broader dimension and includes matters of age, disability, ethnicity, 
marital or family status, religious or cultural background, sexual orientation 
and gender identity.43  
The 2009 CAMAC Report on diversity focused on gender, age and ethnicity as 
the major components of diversity. More explicitly in its conclusion, it stated: 
In relation to board diversity in Australian public listed companies, gender is 
just one, if one of the most obvious, of the measures of board diversity. 
Similar issues may arise with age, ethnicity or other measureable or less 
tangible aspects of differentiation.44 
Alicia Yi comments on the effect of diversity. She states:  
Diversity will be an important factor in determining future winners in Asia 
Pacific, one of the world’s most exciting and dynamic markets. The real 
question is whether boards and senior leadership are fully prepared to guide 
companies in this environment and to take Asia Pacific enterprises to the next 
level.45  
Du Plessis, O’Sullivan and Rentschler suggest that  
‘diversity’ at board level encompasses a number of human attributes, of 
which gender is but one. The United States Department of Agriculture 
Strategic Planning Task Force on Diversity provides the following definition: 
‘[D]iversity is differences among people with respect to age, class, ethnicity, 
gender, physical and mental ability, race, sexual orientation, spiritual 
41 Mahadeo, Soobaroyen and Hanuman, above n 39, 378 (references omitted). 
42 Ibid 381. 
43 Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council, above n 6, 12.  
44 CAMAC, above n 32, 51. 
45 The Korn Ferry Institute, above n 27, 4. 
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practice, and other human attributes.’ Nonetheless, the board diversity debate 
is dominated by gender — both in Australia and abroad.46  
A more sustainable proposition, drawing on the report from CAMAC,47 is that 
enlightened companies can be expected to perform better than others and that 
they will inevitably be the ones who seek talent from all sources, with gender 
being a very secondary consideration for them. In other words, diversity in itself 
is not relevant to the issue of effective governance. Rather, what counts is a 
studied approach to the constitution of a governing board, with a mind open to 
available talent. While a mix of backgrounds and perspectives may be 
beneficial on a board, diversity should not be pursued at all costs. Instead, 
boards are best constituted around a common purpose, and on the basis of the 
ability of the board members to work together. CAMAC recommendations state 
that 
the ultimate question in terms of the governance culture of Australian 
companies is whether the environment and current practices are conducive to 
boards being constituted with well-qualified candidates in an effective mix 
for the furtherance of their corporate purposes. … [M]ore transparent board 
processes, and more information about the reasons for putting forward new 
directors, will assist shareholders in questioning a board’s approach or in 
voting on board appointments. … [T]here is … scope for governments, 
business leaders and others to encourage companies to take a more open 
approach to board selection, and to facilitate opportunities for women to gain 
experience that will equip them for board roles.48 
The ASX Listing Rules and the 2010 amendments to the ASX Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations49 require companies to adopt 
policies of greater diversity on boards and to disclose progress made. While 
there is unlikely to be a quick fix, encouragement of a more robust and open 
approach to board appointments and attention to any impediments in the area 
of executive management should contribute to change, including more diversity 
through better utilisation of valuable talent.  
One report, produced by the Korn Ferry Institute, quotes the Chair of Telstra 
Ltd, Catherine Livingstone, as saying: ‘While diversity of gender is desirable 
46 Jean du Plessis, James O’Sullivan and Ruth Rentschler, ‘Multiple Layers of Gender Diversity 
on Corporate Boards: To Force or Not to Force?’ (2014) 19(1) Deakin Law Review 1, 3.  
47 CAMAC, above n 32, 2. 
48 Ibid 52–3. 
49 Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, above n 6.  
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on boards, diversity of skills, experience and ideas are of equal importance’.50 
In the same report, the Managing Director of the ASX Ltd, Elmer Funke 
Kupper, is quoted as stating: 
Research shows that companies with diverse management teams and boards 
perform better. It seems obvious — and yet progress toward improving 
diversity can be frustratingly slow ... Real change, however, comes from a 
belief that businesses need to tap into 100% of the available talent, not 50%.51 
The Korn Ferry Institute’s report surveyed 57 female directors in Australia who 
were appointed to listed boards after 2010, when the Australian Securities 
Exchange introduced changes to its Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations on the reporting of diversity. The survey examines the paths 
women took to arrive on the boards of Australia’s largest listed companies and 
highlights the importance of a strong network, usually gained throughout the 
course of an executive career, for women who seek board roles. 
This has been followed by a 2014 report by KPMG on behalf of the ASX, 
providing an analysis of the disclosures on diversity made by a selection of 
ASX listed entities with financial years that ended between 31 December 2012 
and 30 December 2013. It focuses on an analysis of the second full year of 
reporting and provides for comparisons to be made and trends drawn between 
the first and second full years of reporting. The report’s primary finding is that 
there is a need to ‘recognise the benefits of diversity’.52 The report observes 
that many organisations expressed the view that a broader workforce of people 
with diverse skills and backgrounds was beneficial to the organisation. These 
organisations also reported improvements to the bottom line and better results 
for shareholders and other stakeholders. Some of the key benefits disclosed by 
companies with diverse boards include enhanced corporate performance, 
reputation, and shareholder value. Research has shown that increased gender 
diversity on boards is associated with better financial performance.53  
50 The Korn Ferry Institute, ‘Beyond ‘if not, why not’: The Pathway to Directorship for Women 
in Leadership’ (Report, The Korn Ferry Institute, 2014), 3 <http://www.kornferry.com/ 
institute/787-beyond-if-not-why-not-the-pathway-to-directorship-for-women-in-leadership>.  
51 Ibid 2. 
52 KPMG, ‘ASX Corporate Governance Council Principles and Recommendations on Diversity: 
Analysis of Disclosures for Financial Years Ended between 31 December 2012 and 30 
December 2013’ (Report, KPMG, 2014) 16. 
53 Reibey Institute, ‘ASX 500 — Women Leaders’ (Research Note, 30 June 2011) 
<http://www.reibeyinstitute.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/ASX500_Women-Leaders-
2011.pdf> and Catalyst, The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and Women’s 
Representation on Boards (October 2011), Catalyst <http://www.catalyst. 
org/system/files/The_Bottom_Line_Corporate_Performance_and_Womens_Representation_o
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Further, the report includes a discussion going ‘beyond gender’ which states 
that:  
While gender diversity is the focus of the Diversity Recommendations, the 
majority of entities within all three samples established policies with a broad 
interpretation of diversity that covered more than gender. ... Examples 
included the establishment of policies on indigenous education and 
employment, and programs to support mature age employees to plan their 
career and retirement.54 
The academic literature and research on women on boards, can be useful in the 
examination of the diversity issue on boards of directors. Nagarajan applies 
complex regulatory theory in her examination of the key reasons for the lack of 
women on boards.55 Her study notes that:  
Tackling the gender gap on the boards of public listed companies provides us 
with an accessible and fascinating site to reconsider the effectiveness of the 
variety of regulatory tools and to reflect on the role of the various participants 
in the regulatory game in Australia. Whereas a small number of governments 
have elected to rely on hard laws to action this systemic shift, many other 
nations, including Australia, have outsourced this task to non-state regulators 
who have relied on soft laws to do the job.56  
The four main reasons for increasing the representation of women on boards 
are, as stated by Nagarajan: (1) making boards more democratic representations 
of societies’ diversity; (2) improving decision making by increasing the range 
of views, values and experiences represented; (3) improving corporate 
profitability; and (4) enhancing the corporate image for shareholders, 
employees and consumers.57  
It is true to say that all these arguments are both interrelated and highly 
contested. Reviewing the existing regulatory toolkit available to change 
behaviour is, in fact, directly taken from the playbook of Ayres and 
Braithwaite.58 More accurately, Nagarajan observes that the approach of 
n_Boards.pdf> cited at footnote 11 of ASX Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations KPMG, above n 52, 77.  
54 KPMG, above n 52, 18. 
55 Vijaya Nagarajan, ‘Regulating for Women on Corporate Boards: Polycentric Governance in 
Australia’ (2011) 39 Federal Law Review 255. 
56 Ibid 255. 
57 Ibid 257. 
58 See Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992) and John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global 
Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
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‘[p]olycentric governance is not a panacea. But it has resulted in experimental 
efforts with multiple benefits at multiple levels’.59 In conclusion, polycentric 
governance does not provide a straightforward way to encourage compliance 
with diversity norms or to facilitate stakeholder enforcement of gender or other 
diversity on boards of directors. 
A further study by Adams and Ferreira states that ‘despite the importance of 
gender diversity in the policy debate, relatively little research links diversity 
and corporate governance’.60 Building on the detailed work of Carter, Simkins 
and Simpson did not find a definite positive relationship between gender and 
ethnic diversity on the board and corporate performance.61 However, Adams 
and Ferreira do find a positive link between board diversity and effectiveness, 
albeit one that is more complex than previous studies have found.62 Kang, 
Cheng and Gray state that ‘[a]mong the most significant governance issues 
currently faced by the modern corporation are those relating to diversity, such 
as gender and age, and independence of directors’.63 Although there has been 
mixed evidence and constant debate regarding the effect of board composition 
on performance, diversity of board membership is still considered desirable.64 
Wang and Clift similarly observe that,  
in spite of some progress during the past 20 years, corporate boards in the 
UK, USA and Australia remain dominated by white males. … [T]he 
homogeneity of corporate boards may raise significant ethical, political and 
economic issues, while women and minorities are continuing to become a 
larger proportion of the workforce.65  
The empirical evidence provided in these studies and the detailed assessment 
of the top 500 companies listed on the ASX demonstrates a link between board 
structure and financial performance. The study supports an equity argument for 
increased diversity. 
59 Nagarajan, above n 55, 275. 
60 Renée B Adams and Daniel Ferreira, ‘Women in the Boardroom and their Impact on 
Governance and Performance’ (2009) 94 Journal of Financial Economics 291, 292. 
61 David A Carter, Betty J Simkins and W Gary Simpson, ‘Corporate Governance, Board 
Diversity and Firm Value’ (2003) 38 Financial Review 33. 
62 Adams and Ferreira, above n 60, 307. 
63 Kang, Cheng and Gray, above n 40, 194. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Yi Wang and Bob Clift ‘Is There a “Business Case” for Board Diversity?’ (2009) 21(2) Pacific 
Accounting Review 88, 88.  
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VI INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE  
The international experience with diversity of board membership is not as clear 
as one might expect. Clearly many countries have a continuing focus on the 
gender of board members and some countries are encouraging diversity. The 
evidence is mixed as to the success of any one country in producing greater 
diversity on boards or even increasing the level of female directorship. The 
exceptions are countries where there are mandatory quotas with consequences 
for companies which fail to fulfil these quotas. Norway, with its 40 per cent 
requirement is leading the way. Other European and some Asian countries are 
following a similarly drastic approach in order to accelerate through legislative 
mandate what should be occurring either naturally or voluntarily. 
The 2013 Korn Ferry Institute diversity report provides some valuable 
independent data across nine Asian countries on board membership.66 This was 
the second comprehensive study of corporate boards at the 100 largest listed 
companies in key markets across the Asia Pacific region, including Australia, 
China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and South 
Korea. This report builds on findings from 2011 and provides new insights into 
the progress of board composition diversity in the Asia Pacific region. Its 
findings indicate 
that in a few countries, most notably Australia, companies are beginning to 
fundamentally reshape their boards to embody a diverse set of professional 
experience, personal background, expertise and gender. Conversely, 
companies in countries such as Japan and Korea have made little progress in 
this area, underscoring issues that could limit their prospects when squeezed 
between more progressive companies in the U.S and massive players from 
China.67  
The report is particularly useful as it goes beyond gender diversity and 
examines age and ethnic diversity, as well as diversity based on ‘age and 
education’. 
The Korn Ferry Report states that: 
By ensuring sufficient diversity, high-performing boards can be assured that 
board decisions will be vigorously debated by individuals with different 
perspectives leading to improved board monitoring, better board meeting 
attendance rates, and causes boards [sic] to be more stakeholder focused — 
boosting shareholder value and representing customers, employees, and 
66 The Korn Ferry Institute, above n 27, 9. 
67 Ibid 4.  
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business partners… A diverse group of directors is more likely to raise 
questions, challenge the status quo, or spot new opportunities. Appointing 
directors from different ethnic, age and educational backgrounds can 
immediately add multiple perspectives to the oversight lens.68  
The general thrust of the Report is very similar to that of the 2009 CAMAC 
Report,69 stressing the need for increased transparency in relation to 
appointments and disclosures. As stated in the Korn Ferry report:  
The key to increasing diversity, and also addressing other demands for 
directors to be independent, competent, and committed, is to have a robust 
and transparent board nomination process. Prevailing practices of recruiting 
directors through personal networks or selecting corporate leaders who 
already sit on other boards need to be phased out in favor of a more formal, 
professionally managed selection process designed to gather the widest 
variety of candidates. Gaps and weaknesses in the current board need to be 
identified and a framework of competencies and attributes desired in new 
directors developed.70  
The Korn Ferry Institute report research demonstrates that the issue of age 
diversity in relation to boards arises across eight Asian markets. It notes that 
‘China and Hong Kong have the highest percentage of companies with directors 
from two or more generations. Japan has the highest percentage of companies 
with single generation boards, followed by South Korea’.71  
Of even greater consequence is the issue of ethnic diversity, as this employs 
assumptions as to race and culture, which are not precise concepts. The Korn 
Ferry Institute study found that:  
More than half of the companies in Australia, China, India, Japan, New 
Zealand and South Korea have boards consisting solely of board members 
from a single ethnicity. The majority of boards, other than those in Australia 
and China, are composed of three or more ethnic groups, with Malaysia and 
Singapore having the most.72  
The work of Du Plessis, Saenger and Foster further examines the international 
board diversity issue, in relation to Europe (Norway, France, and Germany), 
Australia and South Africa. Because the debate on board diversity is wider than 
just a debate on gender diversity their study also reviews cultural, national, race 
68 Ibid 33.  
69 CAMAC, above n 32, 2.  
70 The Korn Ferry Institute, above n 27, 33.  
71 Ibid 17. 
72 Ibid 18. 
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and age diversity, as well as diversity among stakeholders. The authors assert 
that: 
At both a national and EU level, there have been serious attempts to address 
board diversity, in particular, the issue of underrepresentation of women on 
the boards of public companies. The European countries Belgium, Norway, 
France, the Netherlands and Spain have taken the lead in introducing 
legislation to mandate up to 40% women on the boards of public companies.73  
There are, however, several other countries where it is argued that the same 
could be achieved, over time, through voluntary codes of conduct. It is 
therefore clear that there is currently a deep divide as to what method should 
be used to achieve board diversity generally, and gender diversity in 
particular.74  
The authors further observe that,  
since 2010, there have been serious efforts to make sure that more women are 
appointed to Australian boards, especially for listed companies. The gender 
imbalance on boards is currently being addressed by the Australian Securities 
Exchange’s (ASX) Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations, which is the voluntary code of corporate governance 
applying to all listed companies through the ASX’s Listing Rules. It is not 
difficult to predict that if the right gender balance is not going to be achieved 
through the voluntary code of corporate governance, as in some other 
countries … mandatory quotas of women on Australian boards will be 
dictated by legislation.75  
Moreover, Du Plessis, Saenger and Foster note that: ‘[T]he debate on board 
diversity in Australia is dominated by gender diversity. However, it is clear that 
gender diversity is seen in the broader context of board diversity generally, 
including age, [ethnic] and cultural diversity.’76  
New Zealand (NZ) is trying to directly increase the number of females on 
boards, but by 2012 the incidence of women directly participating in 
governance roles was — of all directors in the top 100 NZ companies by 
capitalisation on the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) — only 14.75 per 
cent. This is despite the fact that it is recorded that 55 per cent of the top 100 
73 Jean J du Plessis, Ingo Saenger and Richard Foster, ‘Board Diversity or Gender Diversity? 
Perspectives from Europe, Australia and South Africa’ (2012) 17(2) Deakin Law Review 207, 
222.  
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid 223.  
76 Ibid 230.  
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NZX companies have at least one female director. The NZ census report states 
that: 
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women told New Zealand in 2012 that ‘while there is co-operation between 
the Government and the private sector to identify targets for the advancement 
of women in decision-making positions, the targets, goals and time frames set 
out are not sufficient and may be a symptom of regression rather than 
progress in women’s representation’.77  
Du Plessis, O’Sullivan and Rentschler have examined whether diversity of 
corporate board membership is desirable, and how that diversity can best be 
achieved, including whether diversity is better achieved by mandatory 
requirements or voluntary targets.78 Whilst recognising that diversity is broader 
than gender diversity, the authors focus on gender debates, providing a 
framework for analysis of a topical issue. The authors take the view that board 
gender diversity represents both governance and community expectations but 
that change is progressing slowly in Australia. They present arguments both for 
and against board gender diversity, and examine the current state of board 
composition, while also disclosing their position that board gender diversity 
aids decision-making by bringing greater heterogeneity to boards. 
Du Plessis, O’Sullivan and Rentschler note as follows: 
A change in cultural attitudes, so that the advantages of diversity are 
recognised and female participation encouraged, will increase the quantity of 
qualified, experienced female directors in a sustainable and productive 
manner. Current data demonstrates improvement in Australia’s board-level 
gender diversity, with 22 per cent of all new 2012 ASX 200 board 
appointments being women (or a total of 41 women). Strong progression 
towards equitable representation has continued over three years, with 68 
female appointments in 2011 (comprising 28 per cent of the total) and 56 
(comprising 25 per cent of new appointments) in 2010.79 
The Australian position has been impacted by the third edition of the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council’s Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations, as amended and adopted in 2010. The ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, following public consultation, made amendments to the 
second (2007) edition and refined the relevant Principle 1. In the third edition, 
77 New Zealand Human Rights Commission, ‘New Zealand Census of Women’s Participation 
2012’ (Census, 2012) 3. 
78 Du Plessis, O’Sullivan and Rentschler, above n 46. 
79 Ibid 27. 
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Recommendations 1.4 and 1.5 were added to include accountability and 
diversity. Principle 2 in the document deals with the issue of structuring the 
board to add value. Specifically, Recommendation 2.1, which provides that 
‘[t]he board should establish a nomination committee’, requires boards to report 
upon director recruitment, including procedures to consider talent from diverse 
sources.  
The 2009 CAMAC Report had recommended that  
a starting point in any move to encourage greater gender (or other) diversity 
on boards is to … make their appointment processes more transparent and to 
formalise their processes for keeping board composition under review in the 
light of performance and changing needs.80  
No change to the principle was made; however, additions were recommended 
under ‘selection and appointment process and re-election of directors’, with the 
aim of promoting diversity by encouraging companies to consider broad 
sources when recruiting directors. Principle 3 aims to promote ethical and 
responsible decision-making, with Recommendation 3.1 representing the most 
significant amendment to the ASX’s Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations. It requires the establishment of a code of conduct for its 
directors, senior executives and employees and the disclosure of that code or a 
summary of it.  
The ASX’s Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations are 
developed on an ‘if not, why not’ basis, enabling listed companies to elect not 
to adopt any recommendation, provided that they disclose reasons why the 
recommendation was not adopted. Since their introduction during 2003, the 
principles and recommendations have been voluntary. However, the 
cooperative premise of the document and its value as a tool to analyse the 
corporate governance performance of Australian companies has ensured that it 
has been adopted by almost all listed companies. The Australian framework 
supports the principle that it is ultimately ‘for the market to pass judgement on 
the corporate governance practices of Australian companies’ and it is hoped 
that the ‘cooperative goodwill of listed entities’ will continue with regard to 
board gender diversity, avoiding the need for legislative intervention.81  
80 CAMAC, above n 32, 52–3.  
81 Klettner, Clarke and Adams found that most listed companies had fully adopted the ASX 
Corporate Governance Principles: Klettner, Clarke and Adams, above n 19, 151.  
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VII SELECTING BOARD MEMBERS – DIRECTION OF 
TARGETS OR QUOTAS 
The heart of the debate around board structure is how to encourage or mandate 
a diverse board membership. A variety of regulatory techniques have been 
applied in the last 50 years in order to achieve this. Those techniques have 
progressively moved up the Braithwaite82 pyramid of regulatory enforcement 
from cooperation to punishment for lack of disclosure (enforced by civil or even 
by criminal sanctions) to the imposition of formal quotas. The most common 
techniques set targets and use disclosure as a way of using societal and public 
pressure to cause change.  
There has been some academic work on the use of either targets or quotas to 
produce societal change specifically linked to the gender diversity of boards. In 
2014 Kogut, Colomer and Belinky stated that: ‘In many countries, quotas have 
often been employed as a means to assure greater equality in outcome as well 
as in access and opportunity.’83 In the past decade there has been a push for 
political elections to mandate specific gender quotas and now this push is 
moving towards the private sector. Quotas are useful in this regard to transform 
the system from one of high inequality into a system with the critical mass of 
female directors needed to produce structured equality. The small amount of 
research on the selection of directors has consistently found tokenism and 
dominant male homophily (the preference for associating with like people).84 
Female representation on boards has, globally, stagnated at the 15 per cent level 
on average, and tokenism is a basic response to external pressures. Director 
selection based on homophily is an important element in board composition.85  
Academics have noted that ‘[i]n the context of improving structural equality at 
the top of the corporation for women and minorities, the implication is that a 
82 Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 58; Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 58; and Marina Nehme, 
Margaret Hyland and Michael Adams, ‘Enforcement of Continuous Disclosure: The Use of 
Infringement Notice and Alternative Sanctions’ (2007) 21(2) Australian Journal of Corporate 
Law 1.  
83 Bruce Kogut, Jordi Colomer and Mariano Belinky, ‘Structural Equality at the Top of the 
Corporation: Mandated Quotas for Women Directors’ (2014) 35 Strategic Management 
Journal 891. 
84 Anna Stafsudd, ‘People are strange when you’re a stranger: senior executives select similar 
successors’ (2006) 3(3) European Management Review 177. 
85 James Westphal and Laurie Milton, ‘How Experience and Network Ties Affect the Influence 
of Demographic Minorities on Corporate Boards’ (2000) 45(2) Administrative Science 
Quarterly 366. 
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small quota can achieve large structural consequences, and such a policy is 
deserving of consideration’.86 They also explain as follows: 
Recent studies suggest that the lack of gender diversity in the boardroom is 
troublesome, raising ethical and performance implications as well as general 
stakeholder management issues. In 2012, only 16% of American board seats 
were filled by women. Meanwhile, women represent almost 60% of the 
workforce in the United States. … Board gender diversity, simply defined as 
the proportion of women on the board, is also gaining in publicity as 
shareholders file numerous proposals and institutional investors release 
policy statements to contest the status quo. Meanwhile countries such as 
Norway and Israel spawn a rich conversation recorded in the American public 
press and stimulate U.S. regulating bodies … to further examine the issue.87 
The UK position on voluntary targets is articulated by Lord Davies’s 
announcement in 2011 that London Stock Exchange listed companies should 
have 25 per cent female directors by 2015.88 As of March 2014, the third annual 
progress report into Women on Boards shows that 20.7 per cent of board 
positions in FTSE10089 companies are female, compared with the 2011 result 
of only 12.5 per cent. Real progress appears to have been made by the UK’s 
largest companies, but this is not as yet the case across all public companies. 
Ninety-eight out of the FTSE100 companies have at least one female director. 
With 50 additional female director appointments to the boards of FTSE100 
companies the 25 per cent target would be achieved. As of March 2014, 25.5 
per cent of non-executive directors and 6.9 per cent of executive directors were 
female. Of the 1117 FTSE100 board positions 231 were female, and women 
accounted for 28 per cent of all board appointments in the 2013/14 timeframe. 
In respect of the FTSE250, females represented 15.6 per cent of overall board 
directorships, and 33 per cent of board appointments. However, 48 of the top 
250 companies still had all male boards.90 
The Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators in the UK conducts a 
twice-yearly survey of company secretaries in FTSE350 companies: the FT-
86 Kogut, Colomer and Belinky, above n 83, 901. 
87 Elise Perrault, ‘Why Does Board Gender Diversity Matter and How Do We Get There? The 
Role of Shareholder Activism in Deinstitutionalizing Old Boys’ Networks’ (2014) 4 Journal of 
Business Ethics (online) 149. 
88 Lord Davies of Abersoch, ‘Women on Boards’ (Report, Lord Davies of Abersoch, March 
2014) 4.   
89 Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE), FTSE 100, 28 November 2014 
<http://www.ftse.com/analytics/factsheets/Home/DownloadConstituentsWeights/?indexdetail
s=UKX>. 
90 Lord Davies of Abersoch, above n 88. 
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ICSA ‘Boardroom Bellwether Survey’. It shows that between the first survey 
conducted in March 2012 to the latest conducted in July 2014 company 
secretaries expected board diversity to increase with respect to business 
experience (from 70 per cent to 87 per cent of respondents), and geographical 
area (from 30 per cent to 61 per cent of respondents). However, only 53 per 
cent of respondents expected Lord Davies’s 25 per cent target of female 
directors to be met by 2015. When surveyed about their own companies, 16 per 
cent reported that their boards were not diverse, and 18 per cent did not think 
their company could meet the 25 per cent target. The use of quotas to meet 
targets was very unpopular: only 5 per cent of respondents thought that the UK 
is likely to introduce quota legislation, and 77 per cent regarded it as unlikely. 
When asked whether a sufficient pipeline of high quality female candidates 
existed to fill future board positions, only 16 per cent of respondents thought 
the supply sufficient to support a sustainable pool of talented board-ready 
women in the future, and 48 per cent believed it would be insufficient. In 2012 
up to 60 per cent thought that the pipeline was insufficient, and 11 per cent 
thought it was sufficient.91 
In Australia, the former Federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Elizabeth 
Broderick has said ‘getting more women onto boards … is not just about gender 
equity. It’s also about our desire to remain internationally competitive. No 
country, industry or organisation can afford to waste the skills of more than half 
its population’.92 BlackRock, one of the world’s leading investment 
management and advisory companies, describes Australia’s rate of change in 
female board representation as ‘glacial’,93 with 18.2 per cent of directors of 
ASX-200 companies being female, and 41 companies having all female boards. 
For ASX201-300 companies the percentage falls to just 7.6 per cent in the 
Board Diversity Index 2013.94 Four years after the ASX Guidelines adopted a 
diversity disclosure provision, KPMG reports that:  
Overall, although the results show an improvement in the level of reporting 
and disclosures from last year, it is evident that many organisations still have 
a long way to go in terms of establishing clear and measurable objectives and 
91 Peter Swabey, In Tune but out of Touch (1 September 2014) Governance & Compliance 
(online) 50 <https://www.icsa.org.uk/products-and-services/governance-and-compliance/ 
features/sept-2014-in-tune-but-out-of-touch>. 
92 Elizabeth Broderick, ‘Mandatory Quotas May Be Needed on Boards’, Australian Financial 
Review (Sydney), 8 April 2014, 63. 
93 BlackRock, ‘Glacial Change in Diversity at ASX 200 Companies: Can Corporate Australia 
Escape the Imposition of Diversity Quotas?’ (Report, BlackRock, 2012) 
<https://www.wgea.gov.au/sites/default/files/BlackRock_Glacial_Change_in_Diversity_at_A
SX200_companies.pdf>.  
94 Women on Boards, ASX 2012 < http://www.womenonboards.org.au/pubs/bdi/2012/asx.htm>. 
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working towards improving the number of women at all levels across the 
organisation.95  
Du Plessis, Saenger and Foster put a strong argument for the need for quotas. 
The authors give ‘positive examples of countries with statutory quotas’, and 
express the rationale for legislative quotas: ‘The first argument in favour of 
quota legislation is obvious, that gender quota laws have achieved the desired 
results by increasing the percentage of women on boards. This fact is stressed 
by national political stakeholders as well as EU institutions.’96 Further, they 
argue that:  
The research undertaken shows that in Europe, Australia and Germany, the 
debate on board diversity is seen as wider than just a debate on gender 
diversity. Cultural, race, age, stakeholder and nationality diversity also form 
part of the debate. In several European countries, as well as in Australia and 
in South Africa, efforts are being made through voluntary codes of conduct 
to strive for board diversity. Gender diversity is a particular focus in all 
jurisdictions.97  
It can be predicted that in future more women will be appointed to senior 
executive positions and to boards in Europe, Australia and South Africa. What 
the effect of that will be from a business point of view is impossible to predict. 
There is no doubt, however, that women will have a greater say in the corporate 
world in the next five years than they have ever had before. 
Many nations are now developing either mandatory diversity requirements or 
detailed targets to be met over the next five years. This will see rapid change in 
governance, disclosures and information. Examples from the Asia Pacific 
region98 include Malaysia’s June 2011 announcement that its cabinet had 
approved a policy that women must comprise at least 30 per cent of decision-
making positions in the corporate sector, giving companies 5 years to comply. 
Also, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, in May 2012, approved a revised 
Code of Corporate Governance for companies listed on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange. The Code operates on a ‘comply or explain’ basis and, for the first 
time, makes reference to gender diversity. Guideline 2.6 of the Code of 
Corporate Governance recommends that ‘[t]he Board and its board committees 
95 KPMG, above n 52, 4. 
96 Du Plessis, Saenger and Foster, above n 73, 245–6.  
97 Ibid 248.  
98 The Korn Ferry Institute, above n 27, 6.  
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should comprise directors who as a group provide an appropriate balance and 
diversity of skills, experience, gender and knowledge of the company’.99 
In September 2012, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong issued a public 
consultation paper specifically on board diversity and proposed a code 
provision recommending that the nomination committee or the board should 
have a policy concerning board diversity. As of December 2012, the Lok Sabha 
(Lower House) of the Indian Parliament passed the Companies Act 2011 which 
states that prescribed classes of companies should have at least one female 
director.  
Globally, governments and stock exchanges are continuing to enhance 
corporate governance rules and guidelines to promote better diversity on 
boards. A number of countries, especially in Europe, have addressed the issue 
of gender imbalance on boards by changing corporate governance codes or 
implementing quotas. However, more can be done, such as requiring boards to 
set diversity targets and to disclose these targets, as well as plans for achieving 
them. Without greater intervention by regulators, women will continue to be 
significantly underrepresented on boards in the foreseeable future, and other 
aspects of diversity are unlikely to improve.100 
The composition of a board should reflect the company’s target market and 
customer base. Companies that rely solely on men to make strategic decisions 
on products, innovation, and growth are short-changing themselves; they are 
forgoing the fiscal and cultural benefits that women in leadership bring. 
Spender,101 commenting on issues of gender diversity raised in Branson’s 
earlier article and research,102 examines whether the progress of women’s 
appointment onto boards in Australia continues to be ‘glacial’.103 She concludes 
99 Monetary Authority of Singapore, Code of Corporate Governance (May 2012) 6 
<http://www.mas.gov.sg/regulations-and-financial-stability/regulatory-and-supervisory-frame 
work/corporate-governance/corporate-governance-of-listed-companies/code-of-corporate-
governance.aspx>. 
100 The Korn Ferry Institute, above n 27, 7.  
101 Peta Spender, ‘Gender Diversity on Boards in Australia — Waiting for the Great Leap 
Forward?’ (2012) 27(1) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 22. 
102 Douglas M Branson, No Seat at the Table: How Corporate Governance and Law Keep Women 
out of the Boardroom (New York University Press, 2007) and Douglas M Branson, The Last 
Male Bastion: Gender and the CEO Suit at America’s Public Companies (Routledge Press, 
2010). 
103 Anne Ross-Smith and Jane Bridge, ‘“Glacial at Best”: Women’s Progress on Corporate 
Boards in Australia’ in Susan Vinnicombe et al (eds), Women on Corporate Boards of 
Directors: International Research and Practice (2009), 63. 
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that it does, and considers the cultural and structural determinants contributing 
to the undoubtedly slow progress. 
Spender concludes that the representation of women on boards should broadly 
reflect their workforce participation. This claim may be justified by their 
contribution as economic citizens, but goes further. In particular, the role that 
women play on the boards of ASX 200 companies is a measure of women’s 
democratic leadership, and low rates of representation undervalue civic 
participation by women. Conversely, justifications for higher rates of 
participation based on corporate performance are not only methodologically 
doubtful but also unnecessary and potentially condescending to women.104 
Spender concludes as follows: 
[T]he number of women on Australian boards is still disappointingly low, but 
collaborative approaches between corporations, government and civil society 
has [sic] not only generated significant debate about the topic but 
considerable societal pressure for change.105 
Klettner, Clarke and Boersma make further observations that women constitute 
a very small proportion of the total number of directors on corporate boards. 
This is true not only in Australia, but for most countries across the globe. In 
2012 the US organisation Catalyst published data for 44 countries that 
measured the number of women on corporate boards. It showed that the median 
percentage of women on corporate boards in US companies was approximately 
8 per cent.106 The low level of women on corporate boards has been highlighted 
over the last 10 years as a problem that needs to be addressed. There are now 
political and regulatory trends worldwide promoting women in leadership. 
With the aim of replacing slow progress, many governments across the world 
have begun to develop action to promote and/or mandate increased female 
representation on corporate boards.  
  
104 Peta Spender, ‘Gender Diversity on Boards in Australia — Waiting for the Great Leap 
Forward?’ (2012) 27(1) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 22, 38. 
105 Ibid 37. 
106 Catalyst, ‘Quick Takes: Women on Boards’, (Report, Catalyst, 2012) <http://www.board 
agender.org/files/Catalyst-2012-Global-Women-on-Boards.pdf>. 
                                                 
150 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 20 NO 1 
According to Klettner, Clarke, and Boersma, ‘[t]he issue of gender diversity in 
leadership has moved from being an issue of equality and sociology squarely 
into the realm of corporate governance’.107 Women represent a large part, if not 
the majority, of the workforce in many industry sectors, and the under-
utilisation of their leadership potential is a matter of both equity and efficiency. 
The economic benefits that stem from gender equality are also cited. 
The international debate regarding the relative benefits of quotas and targets in 
achieving gender diversity on boards has been hotly contested over the last 
decade. In major European countries mandatory quotas were adopted, while in 
Australia and other countries the voluntary setting of targets has been 
encouraged. Quotas secure substantial change through compliance, while 
targets may encourage change through strategic initiatives. Debates about 
women on boards have focused on measures designed to achieve equality of 
access, and across countries governmental approaches may be categorised as 
‘hard’ or ‘soft’. Hard strategies involve more coercive means of achieving 
equality of outcomes such as legislation for affirmative action and quotas. The 
soft strategies involve persuasion of market actors to achieve equality of access. 
The development of these strategies also involves stakeholder engagement 
which may be classified as coercive (for example, legislation for quotas); liberal 
(promoting voluntary actions by corporate actors); or collaborative (involving 
co-operation amongst stakeholders).108 
To resolve the low level of female participation on boards, the two most 
discussed forms of regulatory intervention are the setting of gender targets or 
quotas. These can be imposed as mandatory by law, with sanctions if they are 
not achieved: for example, Norway’s quota of 40 per cent women on boards. 
Alternatively, they can be softer in nature: for example the UK’s 
recommendation of a target of 25 per cent women on boards which has raised 
expectations even though adoption is formally voluntary. Both of these 
methods have been effective at spurring an increase in numbers although it is 
still too early to judge the effectiveness of the UK’s voluntary approach. 
Further work by Klettner, Clarke and Boersma, on the strategic and regulatory 
approaches to increasing women in leadership, discusses in detail the regulatory 
solutions of quotas or targets. They note the 2009 CAMAC report, and the 
changes to the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s amended 3rd edition of 
the Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, requiring the 
107 Alice Klettner, Thomas Clarke and Martijn Boersma, ‘The Impact of Soft Law on Social 
Change: Measurable Objectives for Achieving Gender Diversity on Boards of Directors’ (2013) 
28 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 138, 140. 
108 Ibid 144. 
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disclosure of diversity.109 The use of the ‘comply or explain’ technique, and the 
interaction of voluntary regulation with market expectations, has been quite 
effective and less costly than US-style prescriptive regulation.110 The 
measurable targets for ASX listed companies, compliance with which must be 
disclosed, is also having some direct influence. There is, however, no clear 
evidence as to which route is more effective for improving gender or other 
diversity factors on boards. 
The researchers draw conclusions, with which the present author agrees to some 
degree. The Australian approach of encouraging change through organisation-
wide policy improvements and targets will, it is hoped, improve female 
representation along the length of the pipeline to leadership and not only at the 
top. However, widespread and significant changes in behaviour and practice 
will be required over a sustained period of time if this goal is to be achieved 
within an entirely voluntary targets regime. There must be a careful monitoring 
of progress, and a measuring of this progress against the performance of 
countries that have adopted quota regimes.111  
VIII CONCLUSION 
It is without doubt time for change in many boardrooms around Australia, as 
well as in many other countries. There is less doubt now than there has ever 
been about the need for greater diversity in board composition, starting with 
gender. Age and ethnicity also need to be taken into account. The more vexing 
questions involve the choice between the introduction of mandated quotas, and 
the implementation of softer voluntary targets. If countries that have adopted 
quotas make more rapid progress in gender diversity in leadership there will, 
presumably, be insistent calls for the adoption of quotas in all jurisdictions. In 
the meantime, rather than quotas and targets being seen to be entirely different 
approaches, they can be seen to be mutually reinforcing. There is a wide 
spectrum of possible regulatory approaches. It will be interesting to see which 
of them prove most effective. Probably, time will tell how effective the new 
ASX Corporate Governance Principles on diversity will be. Also, successful 
companies which demonstrate the many benefits of having a diverse board of 
109 Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council, above n 6, Recommendation 
1.5. 
110 Alice Klettner, Thomas Clarke and Martijn Boersma, ‘Strategic and Regulatory Approaches 
to Increasing Women in Leadership: Multilevel Targets and Mandatory Quotas as Levers for 
Cultural Change’ (2014) Journal of Business Ethics (online) 13 <http://www.vipsight. 
eu/images/jbe.pdf>. 
111 Klettner, Clarke and Boersma, above n 107, 165. 
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directors will affect future developments. In looking to the future we should 
remember Winston Churchill’s observation that ‘however beautiful the 
strategy, you should occasionally look at the results’.112 
112 The Churchill Centre, Winston Churchill for Traders & Analysts: 25 Quotes Chosen to 
Motivate the Financial World (7 March 2013) <http://www.winstonchurchill.org/publications 
/chartwell-bulletin/bulletin-57-mar-2013/winston-churchill-for-traders-a-analysts>. 
                                                 
